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SALES-A COMPARISON OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
RICHARD COSWAY*
[Continued from 35 WAsH. L. RFv. 617 (1960)]
Section 2-501. Insurable Interest in Goods; Manner of Identi-
fication of Goods.
(I) The buyer obtains a special property and an insurable interest
in goods by identification of existing goods as goods to which
the contract refers even though the goods so identified are
non-conforming and he has an option to return or reject them.
Such identification can be made at any time and in any mon-
ner explicitly agreed to by the parties. In the absence of ex-
plicit agreement identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods
already existing and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than
those described in paragraph (c), when goods are shipped,
marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to
which the contract refers;
(c) when the crops are planted or otherwise become growing
crops or the young are conceived if the contract is for the
sale of unborn young to be born within twelve months
after contracting or for the sale of crops to be harvested
within twelve months or the next normal harvest season
after contracting whichever is longer.
(2) The seller retains an insurable interest in goods so long as title
to or any security interest in the goods remains in him and
where the identification is by the seller alone he may until
default or insolvency or notification to the buyer that the iden-
tification is final substitute other goods for those identified.
(3) Nothing in this section impairs any insurable interest recog-
nized under any other statute or rule of law.
In view of the fact that most sales transactions, excepting retail
store sales, start at a time when no particular goods are being dealt
with, it is necessary to determine a point at which time the deal can
be said to change from one about described goods into one about
specific goods. There is a world of difference legally between an
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
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agreement to sell "a ton of coal" and an agreement to sell "this ton
of coal." The point at which the parties are dealing with particular
goods is the point at which those goods are "identified," and the
present section articulates rules for determining this critical event.
Though these rules are subject to modification by agreement, they
can only be supplanted by an explicit agreement.' This invites com-
parison to the present statute respecting the rules for determining
intention of the parties as to when property passes.' The rules set
forth in that statute are also subject to agreement, but the agreement
to override the present statute need not be explicit, it may be found
in the total conduct of the parties. But a more fundamental differ-
ence between the Code's provisions and the present statute is that the
Code's provisions are directed to the simple acts which serve to iden-
tify goods to the contract, while the present statute aims at solving
the abstruse question of when "property" passes. Identification is a
sine qua non of passage of property,' but the goods may be identified
at a time prior to the time title passes.
The contribution of this section of the Code is, thus, to recognize
that once specific goods have been identified to the contract, the buyer
reasonably expects to get those goods and this expectancy is insurable,
whether or not the buyer has "title" or "risk of loss" of the goods.'
This departs from the traditional approach' followed by the Washing-
ton court by which insurable interest coincides with title or risk of
loss.'
With respect to the potential possession concept embodied in this
' See official comment 3.
2 RCW 63.04.200 [UNIFORM SALES Acr § 19].
3 In Gillingham v. Phelps, 5 Wn2d 410, 105 P.2d 825 (1940), 11 Wn.2d 492, 119
P.2d 914 (1941), the court was faced with the problem of determining what evidence
overrides the presumptions created by the present statute. The subject matter of the
transaction, a card club, had been destroyed by fire, and the suit involved the proceeds
of fire insurance. On the first appeal, no evidence was in the record, so the presump-
tion controlled; however, on remand a trial to a jury brought out evidence which was
sufficient to overcome the stated presumptions. The case presented the familiar problem
of whether a contract arose from an oral agreement which anticipated a written em-
bodiment thereof which never came into existence. On this problem, the present
section of the statute is of no help.
If it be determined that a contract for sale does exist, however, the present statute
would seem to create a stronger inference that the goods were identified, but it does
not answer the question of whether the risk of loss was on the buyer. See § 2-509,
UNIFORM CommacxM. CODE (hereinafter cited only to appropriate Code sections).
& Section 2-401.
SVoLD, SALES 186 (2d ed. 1959).
6 HAwnL.AN, SALEs AND BuLr SALES (UNDa THE UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE)
96 (1958).
7 Puget Sound Bulb Exch. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 174 Wash. 691, 26 P2d 84 (1933).8 In at least one situation, though, risk of loss and insurability do not go hand in
hand, for the buyer under a conditional sales contract has an insurable interest. Quinn
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section of the Code,9 the main point of interest in Washington seems
to lie in the official comments which exclude from the concept of
"growing" goods the product of a lumbering, mining or fishing opera-
tion.1" Such products must be identified to the contract by some act
selecting the particular subject matter of the contract of sale.
The seller's security interest is a sufficient one to constitute it as
insurable, and this accords with Washington decisions dealing with
conditional sales."
Section 2-502. Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not
been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price
of goods in which he has a special property under the provi-
sions of the immediately preceding section may on making
and keeping good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price
recover them from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent
within ten days after receipt of the first installment on their
price.
(2) If the identification creating his special property has been
made by the buyer he acquires the right to recover the goods
only if they conform to the contract for sale.
The Washington court has recognized the need for increased pro-
tection of a buyer presented by the seller's insolvency; 12 but this
section of the Code is without precedent and goes farther than exist-
ing law.' Though the statute is worded in terms of allowing the
financing buyer to recover goods from the seller, the obvious impact
is on the seller's creditors, rather than on the seller, since the section
is premised on insolvency. This places the section in a touchy area,
v. Parke & Lacy Mach. Co., 5 Wash. 276, 31 Pac. 866 (1892). But not the risk of
loss. Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925). As a practical
matter, most conditional sales contracts are so drawn as to shift this risk to the buyer.
Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other Than Real Estate Mortgages)-A Comparison
of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, 29 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 39 (1954).
9 Subsection (1) (c). See Johnson, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 VVASH. L. REv. 78, 85 (1959). North Idaho
Grain Co. v. Callison, 83 Wash. 212, 145 Pac. 232, rehearing denied, 87 Wash. 278, 151
Pac. 775 (1915).
10 Official comment 6. Goods in these categories can be identified by customary
methods of marking or other selection. See McFarland v. Wendorf, 1 F.2d 850 (9th
Cir. 1924).
11 Brown v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 176 Wash. 693, 30 P.2d 640 (1934)
Hassett v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 150 Wash. 502, 273 Pac. 745 (1929) ; Osborne v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 387, 156 Pac. 5 (1916).
12 Gardiner v. Gyorog, 109 Wash. 660, 187 Pac. 318 (1920).
13 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SATES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)
141 (1958).
[VOL. 36
SALES AND THE U.C.C.
and it immediately suggests the need for interrelating it with three
other statutes: (1) the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 4 (2) the Washing-
ton statute on filing bills of sale,"5 and (3) the Washington statute
forbidding preferences by insolvent corporations. 6
Insofar as the bankruptcy act is concerned, the prediction gener-
ally made is that the federal statute's foundations lie in state law in
this area, and thus the specific provisions of the Code will govern and
be effective.' 7
Unless the Washington statute providing for recordation of bills
of sale is repealed, it would seem that noncompliance with that statute
will make the buyer's rights under this section of the Code subject to
the superior rights created by that statute in favor of existing cred-
itors. This result is produced by section 2-402 of the Code, previously
discussed, by which an identification of goods under a sale may be
voided by a creditor if fraudulent by any rule of law.
The typical case of preference is that of the seller's obtaining pay-
ment of the price within the specified period of four months prior to
bankruptcy or state proceedings. It would seem that when the buyer
gets title to the goods, if subsequent to his payment of the price, he,
too, obtains a preference if the seller was at that time insolvent. In
view of the fact that the buyer's rights under the presently discussed
section do not turn on his being the owner of the goods, one can
scarcely argue that the buyer is merely taking that which is his and
not collecting a debt. One would predict, however, that the buyer's
compliance with the present section of the Code would not result in
a preference, based on these three observations:
First, the short interval in which the seller's insolvency must occur
to set the statute in motion suggests an analogy to the cash sale rulings
under present law, by which cash sales constitute a present exchange
of values and not preferences.'"
Second, the section itself assumes that in some cases the seller's
creditors will have a substituted asset to which to look, that is the
installments of the price paid and the balance tendered.
"4 11 U.S.C. § 1.
15 RCW 65.08.040.
16 RCW 23.72.010.
17 Comment, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential Conflicts,
53 Nw. U.L. REV. 411, 424 (1958) ; Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security
i s the Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. REv. 571 (1958).18 E.g., Seattle Ass'n Credit Men v. Luster, 37 Wn.2d 192, 222 P2d 843 (1950);
Stern v. Lone, 32 Wn.2d 785, 203 P.2d 1074 (1949).
19 Engstrom v. Benzel, 191 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F2d
684 (9th Cir. 1951).
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Third, the Code itself has recognized the possibility of a preference
in section 2-402, subsection (3) (b). That section applies only where
the identification has been made in satisfaction or security for an ante-
cedent debt. Under the facts pertinent to our present inquiry, the
identification occurred prior to insolvency, else section 2-502 does not
apply. Further, the identification contemplated by section 2-502 is
not one related to an antecedent debt. The buyer's rights under this
section can best be said to vest in him at the time of identification,
and his obtaining the goods by tender of the unpaid price under the
section ought to be held to relate back to the earlier time, thus defeat-
ing any creditor's claim of preference.
This is not to say, however, that the rights of a creditor of the seller
who has obtained a lien by attachment or execution could also be cut
off by the buyer's compliance with this section, for the statute says
that the buyer may recover from the seller, suggesting that some third
persons will be protected. Surely, for example, a bona fide purchaser
can prevail over the buyer if his rights are superior by the operation
of any rule of law.2"
Section 2-503. Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivery.
(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold con-
forming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer
any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take
delivery. The manner, time and place for tender are deter-
mined by the agreement and this Article, and in particular
(a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods
they must be kept available for the period reasonably
necessary to enable the buyer to take possession; but
(b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities
reasonably suited to the receipt of the goods.
(2) Where the case is within the next section respecting shipment
tender requires that the seller comply with its provisions.
(3) Where the seller is required to deliver at a particular destina-
tion tender requires that he comply with subsection (1) and
also in any appropriate case tender documents as described in
subsections (4) and (5) of this section.
(4) Where goods are in the possession of a bailee and are to be
delivered without being moved
20 Section 2-403.
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(a) tender requires that the seller either tender a negotiable
document of title covering such goods or procure acknowl-
ment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the
goods; but
(b) tender to the buyer of a non-negotiable document of title
or of a written direction to the bailee to deliver is sufficient
tender unless the buyer seasonably objects, and receipt by
the bailee of notification of the buyer's rights fixes those
rights as against the bailee and all third persons; but risk
of loss of the goods and of any failure by the bailee to
honor the non-negotiable document of title or to obey the
direction remains on the seller until the buyer has had a
reasonable time to present the document or direction, and
a refusal by the bailee to honor the document or to obey
the direction defeats the tender.
(5) Where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents
(a) he must tender all such documents in correct form, except
as provided in this Article with respect to bills of lading
in a set (subsection (2) of Section 2-323); and
(b) tender through customary banking channels is sufficient
and dishonor of a draft accompanying the documents con-
stitutes non-acceptance or rejection.
The general obligations of the seller, to transfer and deliver the
goods, are stated in an earlier section of the Code.21 The section here
discussed spells out the detailed nature of those requirements, recog-
nizing that inasmuch as delivery to the buyer may require his coopera-
tion, the usual burden on the seller will be to tender delivery. As under
the present statute,22 the presumption is that this is to occur at the
seller's place of business or residence.23
The contract may require the seller to deliver to the buyer's place,
in which event the tender must be made in conformity therewith.
Differing from the present statute, the seller's substantial performance
may not entitle him to recovery of the price. 4 Departing further from
21 Section 2-301.
22 RCW 63.04.440 [UxrFoRm SALES Acr § 43].
23 Section 2-308.24 In United Iron Works v. Wagner, 89 Wash. 293, 154 Pac. 460 (1916), it was held
a question for the jury whether the seller had substantially complied with a contract
requiring delivery of very heavy equipment "on your ground," where the equipment
was landed on a gravel bar near the buyer's ranch, but at a point separated by 300
feet of rough, steep terrain from the place where the equipment was to be installed.
The Code's treatment of materiality of the breach is discussed in connection with sec-
tion 2-601.
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the present statute,' the Code does not treat a contract requiring the
seller to pay the costs of transportation as one requiring delivery by
the seller to the buyer's place. The buyer bears the risk of loss in such
transactions under the Code, but not under the presently operative
statute.26
Not to be overlooked is that often provisions respecting the delivery
obligation of the contract will be in the commercial short-hand terms
of "F. 0. B.," "F. A. S.," and the like, matters particularly and ex-
haustively covered by other sections of the Code.17 The presently dis-
cussed section of the Code applies only where the parties have not
used these accepted commercial terms to spell out their agreement.
Section 2-504. Shipment by Seller.
Where the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the
buyer and the contract does not require him to deliver them at a
particular destination, then unless otherwise agreed he must
(a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make
such a contract for their transportation as may be reason-
able having regard to the nature of the goods and other
circumstances of the case; and
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any
document necessary to enable the buyer to obtain posses-
sion of the goods or otherwise required by the agreement
or by usage of trade; and
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment.
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper
contract under paragraph (a) is a ground for rejection only if
material delay or loss ensues.
The changes made by this section are spelled out in the official
comments. As has been stated elsewhere in this discussion of the
Code, no change in the delivery obligation peculiar to Washington is
made."
25 RCW 63.04.200. Rule 5 [UNIFORM SALES ACT § 19].
2G Official comment 5.
27 Section 2-319. Thus, cases such as Rawleigh Co. v. Harper, 173 Wash. 233, 22
P.2d 665 (1933), and Phoenix Packing Co. v. Humphrey-Ball Co., 58 Wash. 396, 108
Pac. 952 (1910), will be decided under those sections of the Code rather than the
presently discussed section.
2835 WASi. L. REv. 617, 637 n. 82 (1960).
That the seller must exercise due care in arranging for the transportation of the
goods, see Gillarde v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wn.2d 233, 179 P.2d 235 (1947).
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Section 2-505. Seller's Shipment Under Reservation.
(1) Where the seller has identified goods to the contract by or
before shipment:
(a) his procurement of a negotiable bill of lading to his own
order or otherwise reserves in him a security interest in
the goods. His procurement of the bill to the order of a
financing agency or of the buyer indicates in addition only
the seller's expectation of transferring that interest to the
person named.
(b) a non-negotiable bill of lading to himself or his nominee
reserves possession of the goods as security but except in a
case of conditional delivery (subsection (2) of Section 2-
507) a non-negotiable bill of lading naming the buyer as
consignee reserves no security interest even though the
seller retains possession of the bill of lading.
(2) When shipment by the seller with reservation of a security
interest is in violation of the contract for sale it constitutes an
improper contract for transportation within the preceding sec-
tion but impairs neither the rights given to the buyer by ship-
ment and identification of the goods to the -contract nor the
seller's powers as a holder of a negotiable document.
Because of the emphasis of the Code on the particular rights and
duties of the parties to the sales transaction, rather than the general
concept of "title" or "property," it scarcely needs mention that this
section, being limited to the seller's reservation of security, does not
govern any other incident of the sales transaction, such as the risk of
loss. This is the same approach as the one taken by the Washington
court under the present statute29 and as a common law matter.3" The
seller, in short, may reserve a security interest without subjecting him-
self to the risks incident to the beneficial interest in the property.
The nature of the interest retained by the seller depends on the
nature of the bill of lading used. That is to say, whether a straight or
order bill of lading is used, and whether or not the seller is named as
consignee. As under present law, the seller who desires to retain a se-
curity interest which will be effective against third persons should
avoid the use of a straight bill of lading naming the buyer as con-
29 RCW 63.04.210 [UNiFOam SALES AcT § 20].30 Norbom Eng'r Co. v. A. H. Cox & Co., 120 Wash. 675, 208 Pac. 87 (1922)
(taking a bill of lading in the seller's name merely security device) ; Northern Grain
Warehouse Co. v. Northwest Trading Co., 117 Wash. 422, 201 Pac. 903, 204 Pac. 202
(1921).
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signee.31 The straight bill of lading designating the seller as consignee
will, however, reserve the right to possession of the seller.3"
A dictum in Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis Corp.,3 suggests
that at present RCW 63.04.2 10" is limited to contracts involving spe-
cific goods. Quite plainly, the Code's provision is not thus limited, for
it applies in any case where goods are identified to the contract whether
before the shipment or merely by the very act of shipment.
Professor Hawkland articulates an incidental benefit to the seller
to result under the Code, in that by artful use of this section of the
Code, a seller may control the situs of litigation which may be necessary
due to a subsequent rejection of the goods by the buyer.35 Seller's
counsel will find his remarks helpful.
Section 2-506. Rights of Financing Agency.
(1) A financing agency by paying or purchasing for value a draft
which relates to a shipment of goods acquires to the extent of
the payment or purchase and in addition to its own rights under
the draft and any document of title securing it any rights of
the shipper in the goods including the right to stop delivery
and the shipper's right to have the draft honored by the buyer.
(2) The right to reimbursement of a financing agency which has
in good faith honored or purchased the draft under commit-
ment to or authority from the buyer is not impaired by subse-
quent discovery of defects with reference to any relevant docu-
ment which was apparently regular on its face.
No relevant Washington authority has been found.
Section 2-507. Effect of Seller's Tender; Delivery on Condi-
tion.
(1) Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept
the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for
31 While as between seller and buyer, a seller still may insist upon cash payment
where he has used a straight bill running to the buyer, such a bill will enable the buyer
to convey an interest to a third person superior to the retained interest of the buyer.
Official comment 4. Accord, Orilla Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry., 84 Wash.
362, 148 Pac. 850 (1915), reversing 81 Wash. 611, 143 Pac. 152 (1914).
32 Thus the carrier is not authorized to deliver merchandise so shipped to the buyer.
Rountree v. Lydick-Barmann Co., 150 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). The Wash-
ington court's decision on the point is a little obscure, for it "assumes" that the carrier
would be a converter by delivering to the buyer in such a case. Prentice v. Union Pac.
Ry., 28 Wn.2d 212, 182 P.2d 41 (1947).
33 173 Wash. 444, 23 P.2d 572 (1933).
34 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 20.
35 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)
132-34 (1958).
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them. Tender entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and
to payment according to the contract.
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the
buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the
seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his
making the payment due.
Coupled with section 2-511, this Code section adopts the long settled
assumption that, absent agreement or waiver, delivery of the goods
and payment of the price are concurrent conditions. The Washington
court has recognized this rule.3" The presently discussed section thus
makes tender by the seller of complying goods a condition precedent
to the buyer's acceptance and, unless the buyer has agreed to pay the
price independently of any tender, to the buyer's duty to pay. Suffi-
ciency of the seller's tender is, of course, a question of fact. Obviously
the circumstances may permit the seller to recover the price even
though the goods tendered are not precisely in compliance with the
agreement, as in cases where the seller, admitting defects in the goods,
agrees to correct those defects."
As under present decisions, it will be possible for the buyer to waive
the implied condition of tender by the seller, 8 or for the seller to waive
his right to payment of the price in cash on tender. 9 This latter point
is often of significance in determining the rights of a third person who
has purchased from the buyer. This section of the Code does not
govern such a situation, for the wording of the section limits the
application thereof to the seller's rights against the buyer and the
buyer's rights against the seller. Rights of third persons are deter-
mined by a previously discussed section."
Section 2-508. Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Deliv-
ery; Replacement.
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because
non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet ex-
0 Crandall Eng'r Co. v. Winslow Marine Co., 188 Wash. 1, 61 P2d 136 (1936);
Balcom v. Kohno, 124 Wash. 628, 215 Pac. 17, aff'd on rehearing, 127 Wash. 697, 221
Pac. 340 (1923) ; W. E. Dooley & Co. v. Seattle Elec. Supply Co., 122 Wash. 354, 210
Pac. 668 (1922); Wagner Co. v. Craib & Co., 114 Wash. 139, 194 Pac. 584 (1921);
Hunter v. Radford, 111 Wash. 668, 191 Pac. 794 (1920).37 Hallidie Mach.- Co. v. Whidbey Island Sand & Gravel Co., 62 Wash. 604, 114 Pac.
457 (1911).88 Alaska Junk Co. v. McPherson, Fenstamaker, Whitehouse Co., 123 Wash. 254,
212 Pac. 185 (1923).89 Veblen v. Foss, 32 Wn2d 385, 201 P.2d 719 (1949).
4o Section 2-403.
1961]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
pired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his inten-
tion to cure and may then within the contract time make a
conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable
with or without money allowance the seller may if he season-
ably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to sub-
stitute a conforming tender.
The equitable principle underlying subsection (1) has been accepted
and enforced by the Washington court in a somewhat unusual case."'
Essentially, the facts were that the seller and buyer became involved
in a dispute as to certain parts of the equipment sold, the seller main-
taining that it had complied with the contract, and the buyer contend-
ing that the equipment furnished was not adequate. After abortive
efforts to resolve the conflict, the seller sued for the price, and in that
action, the buyer sought rescission of the contract by reason of the
seller's breach. The court decided in the first instance that the seller
had not complied with the contract, so its action for the price could
not be maintained. However, because the seller had acted in good
faith, the court decided that the seller should be given a reasonable
time in which to make the equipment comply with the contract. Thus
it denied the buyer's request for rescission. Implicit in the holding is
the eventual result that if the seller makes good under his contract
within that reasonable time, the buyer will be obligated to pay the
price.
That decision, it will be observed, goes farther than the Code's pro-
vision, but adoption of the Code will not necessitate a backing down
from the holding. The case recognizes that the seller may make good
his tender, even after he has instituted an unsuccessful action for the
price. It is this feature of the decision which is not necessarily required
by the Code's provision.
Subsection (2) of the Code seems to be without previous statutory
or decisional precedent; however, it seems to embody the principle
underlying the entire article by which a party who acts in accordance
with the standards of commercial good faith will be protected from
surprise resulting from the technical demands of the other contracting
party.4 2
41 Robinson v. Puget Elec. Welding Co., 162 Wash. 626, 299 Pac. 405 (1931).
42 See HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 35, at 121-22.
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Section 2-509. Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach.
(1) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the
goods by carrier
(a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular
destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the
goods are duly delivered to the carrier even though the
shipment is under reservation (Section 2-505); but
(b) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular desti-
nation and the goods are there duly tendered while in the
possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
when the goods are there duly so tendered as to enable the
buyer to take delivery.
(2) Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without
being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
(a) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering
the goods; or
(b) on acknowledgement by the bailee of the buyer's right to
possession of the goods; or
(c) after his receipt of a non-negotiable document of title or
other written direction to deliver, as provided in subsection
(4) (b) of Section 2-503.
(3) In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss
passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a
merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of
delivery.
(4) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement
of the parties and to the provisions of this Article on sale on
approval (Section 2-327) and on effect of breach on risk of loss
(Section 2-510).
With one major exception, to be noted in a moment, this section
places the risk of loss on the party who bears it under the present
statute," and like the present statute, is subject to modification by
agreement of the parties." Under the Code, evidence of trade usage
43RCW 63.04.230 [UNiF oR SALES AcT §22].
44 Gillingham v. Phelps, 11 Wn.2d 492, 119 P.2d 914 (1941) 5 Wn.2d 410, 105 P.2d
825 (1940) ; Marks v. Kucich, 181 Wash. 73, 42 P.2d 16 (1935).
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is relevant to a determination of the location of risk of loss, even though
the contract is not ambiguous on the point,45 a position contrary to
that taken by the Washington court."
Where transportation of the goods is involved, the Code will have
the effect of passing the risk of loss to the buyer on delivery to the
carrier, unless the seller is specifically required to deliver. The fact
that the seller is required to arrange and pay the shipping costs does
not mean that he is required to deliver within the meaning of this rule,
thus departing from the present statute.4 Thus in most instances, the
risk of loss during shipment will rest on the buyer.
Where transportation of the goods is not involved, the Code states
rules for two situations: one, where the goods are in the possession of
a bailee,"8 and the other, where the goods are in the possession of the
seller.49 In this latter situation, the Code departs drastically from
present law. Under the present statute, of course, the courts tradi-
tionally locate the risk of loss by first locating the title.5" This, of
course, is modified by the Code. But further, where under the present
statute the parties are dealing with specific goods and nothing remains
to be done by the seller, the rule of thumb is that "property" and thus
risk of loss pass to the buyer when the bargain is made.5' Under the
Code, the risk of loss rests on the party who has possession, where the
seller is a merchant. In other words, so long as the merchant seller re-
mains in possession, he bears the risk of destruction of the goods,
absent a contract shifting that risk. In deals involving sellers who are
45 Official comment 5.
46 Williams v. Ninemire, 23 Wash. 393, 63 Pac. 534 (1900).
47 RCW 63.04.200, Rule 5 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 19]. Washington case authority
for the proposition that risk of harm during transit may be on the seller is practically
nonexistent. In Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. McCann, 48 Wash. 174, 93 Pac. 216
(1908), there is a suggestion that the seller may bear this risk where he is bound to
pay delivery costs, but the holding is that no such obligation was imposed on the facts.
Other cases have put the risk of loss during transit on the buyer for one reason or
another. Inland Seed Co. v. Washington-Idaho Seed Co., 160 Wash. 244, 294 Pac. 991
(1931) ; Discount Corp. of Wash. v. Philippine Mfg. Co., 150 Wash. 274, 272 Pac. 970
(1928); National Fin. Co. v. Emerson, 117 Wash. 297, 201 Pac. 4 (1921) ; Ankeny v.
Young Bros., 52 Wash. 235, 100 Pac. 736 (1909) ; Jones v. Emerson, 41 Wash. 33,
82 Pac. 1017 (1905) ; Roy & Roy v. Griffin, 26 Wash. 106, 66 Pac. 120 (1901) ; Izett
v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 22 Wash. 300, 60 Pac. 1128 (1900). The Code will produce
a similar location of the risk by its position that presumably most transactions are ship-
ment transactions, not delivery transactions. Section 2-503, official comment 5.
The contract may cover this matter by use of commercial terms such as F.O.B.,
F.A.S. and the like. See § 2-319.
48 Section 2-509 (2).
9 Section 2-509 (3).
50 E.g., Inland Seed Co. v. Washington-Idaho Seed Co., 160 Wash. 244, 294 Pac. 991
(1931).
51 MacLeod v. Aberdeen Brewing Co, 82 Wash. 74, 143 Pac. 440 (1914) ; Lauber
v. Johnston, 54 Wash. 59, 102 Paz. 873 (1909).
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not merchants, 2 the risk of loss may be passed to the buyer merely
by a tender of delivery.
The rule is so simple that one is tempted to look behind it for a
catch or trick. There seems to be none. The theory is that the person
in possession is the one most likely to insure, and thus the one most
competent to bear the risk of loss. 3 A breach of contract by either
party has the effect of shifting the risk of loss to that party, however,
under the next section of the Code.
Section 2-510. Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss.
(1) Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the
contract as to give a right of rejection the risk of their loss re-
mains on the seller until cure or acceptance.
(2) Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may to the
extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat
the risk of loss as having rested on the seller from the beginning.
(3) Where the buyer as to conforming goods already identified to
the contract for sale repudiates or is otherwise in breach before
risk of their loss has passed to him, the seller may to the extent
of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the
risk of loss as resting on the buyer for a commercially reason-
able time.
In substance, this section places the risk of loss on either party to
the contract who may have breached it. In the event the seller tenders
or delivers nonconforming goods, the risk of loss of those goods is on
him. This is a terse statement of what, under the present statute, re-
quires some rather complex explaining54 The modification in existing
law is contained in subsection (2), by which the seller is given the
benefit of the buyer's insurance, on the assumption that the buyer,
having possession, is more likely to carry insurance on the goods.
In view of the fact that the risk of loss normally does not pass to
the buyer until delivery or tender thereof under the preceding section
of the Code, subsection (3) states a necessary rule that risk of loss
of identified goods, over and above the seller's insurance, is placed on
5 2 For definitions, see § 2-104.
53 Official comment 3.
54 The seller's shipment by carrier of nonconforming goods' under circumstances
where risk of loss of conforming goods would be on the buyer has caused some diffi-
culty. The risk of loss is on the seller in such a circumstance (as under the Code), but
the reason given is that there was no sufficient appropriation of goods to the contract
VOLD, SALES 195 (2d ed. 1959). See Jones v. Emerson, 41 Wash. 33, 82 Pac. 1017
(1905).
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the buyer if he repudiates or breaches. This protects the seller's in-
terest in his expectancy in selling the goods, and the protection lasts
only a commercially reasonable time within which the seller may make
other disposition of those goods.55
Under the present statute56 and court decisions,5" delay in perform-
ance attributable to either party places the risk of loss resulting from
such delay on that party. Though the matter is not spelled out in the
Code, it would seem that a delay in performance is a breach within
the meaning of the Code's rule.
Section 2-511. Tender of Payment by Buyer; Payment by
Check.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition to
the seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery.
(2) Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means or in
any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless
the seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any ex-
tension of time reasonably necessary to procure it.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act on the effect of an instru-
ment on an obligation (Section 3-802), payment by check is
conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor
of the check on due presentment.
The Code adopts the usually accepted premise that, absent agree-
ment, payment and delivery are concurrent conditions.58 The circum-
stances may show, of course, that this is not the case, as in the
situation where the seller's performance requires an extended period,
so that he must begin his performance prior to any tender by the
buyer.5" This requirement may be waived," and in no event will be
imposed where the tender, if made, would be a useless act."'
55 Professor Williston criticized an earlier version of the Code which appeared to
have placed the risk of loss on the buyer in such circumstances without limitation as
to time. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HARv. L. REv. 561, 583 (1950).56 RCW 63.04.230(b) [UNIFORM SALES ACT § 22(b)].
57 Taggares v. Wagener, 55 Wn.2d 672, 349 P.2d 601 (1960) ; Stephenson v. Ken-
worthy Grain & Milling Co., 186 Wash. 114, 56 P.2d 1301 (1936).
58 Houser v. Atherton, 98 Wash. 386, 167 Pac. 1109 (1917) ; Robinson v. Thoma,
30 Wash. 129, 70 Pac. 240 (1902).
59 Sussman v. Gustav, 109 Wash. 459, 186 Pac. 882 (1920).
60 Wallace v. Babcock, 93 Wash. 392, 160 Pac. 1041 (1916).
61 Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 116 Wash. 266, 199 Pac. 238 (1921)
Hunter v. Radford, 111 Wash. 668, 191 Pac. 794 (1920) ; Houser v. Atherton, 98 Wash.
386, 167 Pac. 1109 (1917).
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Subsection (2) makes it clear that checks, personal and otherwise,
normally used in paying debts may be used as tender, absent objection
by the seller. 2 Said objection by the seller must specify that it is
based on or directed to the medium of payment used. 3 A tender will
not be sufficient, however, unless it is unconditional.64
As between the parties, the tender accomplished by use of a check
is conditional on eventual payment of that check by the drawee." One
should recall, however, that a buyer who obtains possession of the
goods by use of such a check is empowered by the Code to convey a
title to an innocent purchaser superior to that of the seller. 6 The
presently discussed section of the Code does not apply to such a case,
for this section governs the rights of seller and buyer inter se.
Section 2-512. Payment by Buyer Before Inspection.
(1) Where the contract requires payment before inspection non-
conformity of the goods does not excuse the buyer from so
making payment unless
(a) the non-conformity appears without inspection; or
(b) despite tender of the required documents the circumstances
would justify injunction against honor under the provisions
of this Act (Section 5-114).
(2) Payment pursuant to subsection (1) does not constitute an
acceptance of goods or impair the buyer's right to inspect or
any of his remedies.
The official comments point out the minor changes made by this
section. No Washington decisions dealing with this particular point
have been found. This Code section must be read in connection with
the one immediately following.
Section 2-513. Buyer's Right to Inspection of Goods.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), where
goods are tendered or delivered or identified to the contract
62 Phalan, The Obligations of Parties to Sales of Goods Under the Uniform Com-
inercial Code, 62 DIcK. L. REv. 235, 236 (1958).63 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTs § 305 (1932). See Oriental Trading Co. v. Houser,
87 Wash. 184, 151 Pac. 242 (1915).64 Grant v. Auvil, 39 Wnl2d 722, 238 P.2d 393 (1951), noted 27 WAsH. L. REv. 231
(1952). If an unconditional tender is made by the buyer, it would seem that under the
Code § 2-716, there may be a replevin action, though an early Washington decision
seems contrary on this. Hays v. Bashor, 108 Wash. 491, 185 Pac. 814 (1919).
6 Cf. Berliner v. Greenberg, 37 Wn2d 308, 223 P.2d 598 (1950), holding that there
was no accord and satisfaction where the drawer of the check tendered in the accord
stopped payment thereon prior to the time it was cashed.
06 Section 2-403.
19611
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
for sale, the buyer has a right before payment or acceptance
to inspect them at any reasonable place and time and in any
reasonable manner. When the seller is required or authorized
to send the goods to the buyer, the inspection may be after
their arrival.
(2) Expenses of inspection must be borne by the buyer but may
be recovered from the seller if the goods do not conform and
are rejected.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to the provisions of this
Article on C.I.F. contracts (subsection (3) of Section 2-321),
the buyer is not entitled to inspect the goods before payment
of the price when the contract provides
(a) for delivery "C.O.D." or on other like terms; or
(b) for payment against documents of title, except where such
payment is due only after the goods are to become avail-
able for inspection.
(4) A place or method of inspection fixed by the parties is pre-
sumed to be exclusive but unless otherwise expressly agreed
it does not postpone identification or shift the place for de-
livery or for passing the risk of loss. If compliance becomes
impossible, inspection shall be as provided in this section un-
less the place or method fixed was clearly intended as an
indispensable condition failure of which avoids the contract.
Subsection (1) corresponds fundamentally to the present statute.67
An opportunity to inspect is basically a condition precedent to the
buyer's payment or acceptance. At the same time, there is authority
that a seller who denies the opportunity to inspect thereby breaches
his contract," precluding the buyer's liability for the price and sub-
jecting the seller to a suit for damages.
The present statute which, like the Code, gives the buyer the right
of inspection, has been construed as limiting this inspection to one
made by a buyer and not by a third person. The Code does not
seem to require a contrary interpretation; however, a reconsideration
of the point may be in order. The critical issue seems to be whether
67 RCW 63.04.480 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 47].
68 WILLISTON, SALFs § 471 (rev. ed. 1948) ; § 2-310.
69 Pearce v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 14 Wn.2d 132, 127 P.2d 271 (1942). The pre-
cise issue this case poses has been discussed at another point See 35 WASrH. L. REv.
420 (1960).
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such an inspection is reasonable under all the circumstances. One can
scarcely say that such inspection is necessarily unreasonable, yet the
facts may show that the particular inspector selected by the buyer is
hostile to the seller, and thus inspection by him might not be appro-
priate.
The place of inspection, too, must be reasonable, both under the
Code and under the present statute. Where extended transportation
of goods not previously inspected by the buyer is involved, the buy-
er's place will typically be the place of inspection. 0 The circum-
stances or the express agreement of the parties may, however, dem-
onstrate that inspection is to be made elsewhere.71
Subsection (2) spells out the accepted premise that in the first in-
stance the buyer must bear inspection costs, but- if the inspection
shows that the goods do not conform, those inspection costs are part
of his damages, recoverable from the seller."'
Subsection (3) spells out the typical commercial patterns where in-
spection prior to payment is not contemplated, as under "C.O.D."
shipments. Payment under these contracts in no way impairs the
rights of the buyer if the goods do not conform." The section clari-
fies a point of some uncertainty, by spelling out that under certain
circumstances the buyer will have a right to inspect the goods even
though his obligation is to pay against documents. The rule adopted
is the one followed by the Washington court, by which (a) inspection
is allowed if the title documents are to be held until arrival of the
goods,74 or (b) if the contract otherwise calls for such inspection.7 5
Subsection (4) clarifies some uncertain points, and in so doing,
solves problems which have caused difficulty under the present stat-
ute. The points can best be illustrated hypothetically.
First, suppose the agreement calls for inspection by a designated
inspector who dies or is disabled before he can inspect. If, and only
if, inspection by this person was an indispensable condition, the con-
7 0 Inlnd Seed Co. v. Washington-Idaho Seed Co., 160 Wash. 244, 294 Pac. 991
(1931); Dement Bros. Co. v. Coon, 104 Wash. 603, 177 Pac. 354 (1919), (place of
delivery) ; Skinner v. Griffiths & Sons, 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 693 -(1914).
73.Van Dusen Harrington Co. v. W. F. Jahn & Co., 127 Wash. 426, 221 Pac. 301(1923); Mill & Mine Supply Co. v. Seattle Frog & Switch Co., 109 Wash. 351, 186
Pac. 1067 (1920), (place of shipment) ; Tacoma & Eastern Lumber Co. v. Field & Co.,
100 Wash. 79, 170 Pac. 360 (1918) ; Klock Produce Co. v. Robertson, 90 Wash. 260,
155 Pac. 1044 (1916).
72 See 3 WISTisroN, SALES § 477 (rev. ed. 1948).
73 Section 2-512.74 Seattle Nat'1 Bank v. Powles, 33 Wash. 21, 73 Pac. 887 (1903).
7 5 Inland Seed Co. v. Washington-Idaho Seed Co., 160 Wash. 244, 294 Pac. 991
(1931).
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tract fails, by the express provisions of this subsection. In most in-
stances, inability of the inspector designated by the contract will not
frustrate its performance.
Secondly, suppose the agreement calls for shipment over some dis-
tance under circumstances where the buyer has the right to inspect at
destination before payment, but the goods are lost or damaged in ship-
ment without the seller's fault. The statute makes it quite plain that
the buyer is nonetheless liable for the price, if the risk of loss was on
him by the terms of the contract. The stipulation for inspection does
not affect the risk of loss! This is the Washington rule under the
present statute, 6 but the Code crystalizes it and is thus desirable.
A reminder is in order that this section of the Code, and all others,
subjects the parties to the general obligation of good faith, so the
buyer's inspection must be a good faith inspection.7
Section 2-514. When Documents Deliverable on Acceptance;
When on Payment.
Unless otherwise agreed documents against which a draft is drawn
are to be delivered to the drawee on acceptance of the draft
if it is payable more than three days after presentment; other-
wise, only on payment.
This section extends the rule of the present Bills of Lading Act"8
to all forms of title documents. Except for this extension, the Wash-
ington rule on the point will not be changed."9
Section 2-515. Preserving Evidence of Goods in Dispute.
In furtherance of the adjustment of any claim or dispute
(a) either party on reasonable notification to the other and
for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and preserving
evidence has the right to inspect, test and sample the goods
including such of them as may be in the possession or con-
trol of the other; and
(b) the parties may agree to a third party inspection or survey
to determine the conformity or condition of the goods and
76 Skinner v. Griffiths & Sons, 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 693 (1914).
77 Section 1-203. The Washington court has imposed this requirement of good faith
upon the buyer's inspection in Gonter v. Klaber & Co., 67 Wash. 84, 120 Pac. 533
(1912).
78 RCW 81.32.500 [UNIFORm BILLS OF LADING AcT § 41].
79 Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Everbest Shingle Co., 135 Wash. 575, 238 Pac. 644
(1925), reversing 131 Wash. 241, 229 Pac. 743 (1924). The departmental decision
seems to have overlooked the controlling statute.
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may agree that the findings shall be binding upon them in
any subsequent litigation or adjustment.
Though there are no specific decisions on the rule of law set forth
in this section, one may readily visualize the impact of scientific test-
ing on the vigor with which a claim of defect is pressed or defended."
This section of the Code seems unique in commercial statutes, in that
its effect is to foster settlement of claims. Its importance, in short,
is not in the substantive provision but in the probable effect it will
induce in disputants in commercial matters. It tends to prevent sur-
prise, thus implementing policies permitting ready discovery.
Section 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery.
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment
contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under
the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-
718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in
any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
Perhaps the most startling and noteworthy provision in this section
is the recognition that a buyer may reject goods which in any respect
fail to conform to the contract. This means what it says, and the
buyer need not limit his rejection to cases of material breach.8" The
Washington court has tended to recognize this rule,8" though there is
80In Williams v. S. H. Kress Co., 48 Wn.2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955), the reliability
of such a test was shaded by a claimed inability on the seller's part to trace the par-
ticular goods from the buyer to the testing laboratory. This was sufficient to cause the
trial court to discredit the test, but one is impressed by the impact of the results of such
tests on the trier of facts.81 
"Limitation of UCC Section 2-601 to cases of material breach was urged in Hon-
nold, The Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 457 (1949), and in the 1956
Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. (1956) No. 65(A),
pp. 26-27. That recommendation was rejected by the editorial board on two grounds:
First, that the buyer should not be required to guess at his peril whether a breach is
material; second, that proof of materiality would sometimes require disclosure of the
buyer's private affairs such as secret formulas or processes." BRAucERa & SUTHER-
LA-D, CoM ERcLAL TRANsAcrioNs: CASES AND PROBLEMS 56 (2d ed. 1958).
82 C. A. Mauk Lumber Co. v. Miller Bros. Lumber Co., 126 Wash. 593, 219 Pac. 28
(1923). Where the seller has built goods for a special use of the buyer, so that a rejec-
tion by the buyer on a technicality would mean that the seller suffers substantially
where he cannot sell those goods on the ordinary market, the analogy to the building
contracts seems rather plain. In such cases, substantial performance by the seller may
be adequate. A decision to that effect is Harrild v. Spokane School Dist., 112 Wash.
266, 192 Pac. 1 (1920).
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no clear cut adoption of it." Under the Code, there will be exceptions
to this policy of allowing a buyer to stand on a trivial breach, as
follows:
First, in installment contracts, the buyer may reject only if the non-
conformity of goods "substantially impairs" the value of an install-
ment.84
Second, a seller will be protected against surprise when a buyer re-
jects on some trivial ground, because he will have a reasonable time
in which to correct the matter.8"
Third, a buyer may lose his ground for rejecting if he fails to par-
ticularize it.8
Fourth, the materiality of a breach is necessarily involved in an
action for damages based on that breach."
Fifth, once goods are accepted, the acceptance can be revoked only
for substantial non-conformity.88
Apart from these, it is believed that the buyer may reject with im-
punity goods which in the slightest degree depart from the bargained-
for standards.
The Code will clarify Washington law on the extent to which the
buyer is authorized in rejecting a part of delivered or tendered goods
and accepting the balance. The Code permits him to do this, limiting
him only to breaking the contract into commercial units 8 where the
price can reasonably be determined and where accepting a part does
not impair the value of the remaining portion of the goods.8 The
Washington court appears to allow partial rejection only in divisible
contracts," and seems to require that a unit price be specified for each
83 In Ketchum v. Albertson Bulb Gardens, Inc., 142 Wash. 134, 252 Pac. 523 (1927),
a seller who had agreed to deliver "Flamingo" bulbs had substituted "Clara Butt" bulbs
was sued for damages by the buyer. The seller was permitted to show that the delivered
bulbs were of equal value to those for which he contracted. The rule here adopted
would presumably not be changed by the Code, for the issue was one of provable dam-
ages after the buyer had accepted; it was not an issue of whether the buyer could have
refused the tender of the substituted bulbs.
There is, in short, a distinction to be drawn between cases where the buyer rejects
goods (where substantial performance does not apply), and those where the issue is
merely one of damages, where performance by the seller, though different from that
bargained for, may have been "just as good" as that contracted for. See Barry v.
Danielson, 78 Wash. 453, 139 Pac. 223 (1914).
84 Section 2-612.
85 Section 2-508.
86 Section 2-605.
87 See case cited note 83 supra.
88 Section 2-608.
89 As defined in Section 2-105.
90 Official comment 1.
91 Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) ; Lucas v. Andros, 185
Wash. 383, 55 P.2d 330 (1936) ; Creel v. Nettleton, 151 Wash. 440, 276 Pac. 91 (1929) ;
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Scott, 131 Wash. 328, 230 Pac. 151 (1924) ; da Ponte
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unit as a test for whether or not the contract is divisible.2 This last
mentioned requirement has been held not to be necessary to show
that a contract is entire, where separate prices have been set for units
but the units are part of a larger functioning whole. 3 In such trans-
actions, the buyer cannot accept and reject part of the goods under
the Code, for he is bound by commercial good faith and thus may not
unduly impair the value of the remaining goods.94 Aside from this,
however, it is suggested that the Code does not limit the buyer's par-
tial rejection to contracts deemed divisible under ordinary contract
principle, so long as the value of the portions retained can reason-
ably be determined. 5
Section 2-602. Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection.
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their
delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer season-
ably notifies the seller.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two following sections on re-
jected goods (Sections 2-603 and 2-604),
(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with
respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the
seller; and
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession
of goods in which he does not have a security interest
under the provisions of this Article (subsection (3) of Sec-
v. Simonian, 127 Wash. 214, 220 Pac. 799 (1923) ; Weatherred v. Hirai, 115 Wash. 142,
196 Pac. 572 (1921).2 Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) ; Darst v. Meduna, 15
Wn2d 293, 130 P2d 361 (1942); Creel v. Nettleton, 151 Wash. 440, 276 Pac. 91(1929) ; Buckeye Buggy Co. v. Montana Stables, Inc., 43 Wash. 49, 85 Pac. 1077(1906)."93 Greenwood v. International Harvester Co., 122 Wash. 603, 211 Pac. 727 (1922).94 In Kramer v. Zappone, 53 Wn.2d 115, 330 P.2d 1072 (1958), 'a buyer was denied
the right to retain bolts and other miscellaneous parts of awnings where he had pur-
chased unassembled awnings. Under the Code, the awnings, not the parts, would seem
to be the commercial units and thus a similar outcome would follow.
In a somewhat nostalgic case, a Tucker dealer, being sued for the down payment he
had received on a Tucker auto, contended that the buyer was liable for the price of a
tool kit delivered to him which was supposed to have been used on his new Tucker.
While the kit could have been used on other cars, the court held that the buyer was
not obligated to take the kit without the car, and it would seem that commercial stand-
ards of fair play would, under the Code, produce a similar result. Kraft v. Spencer
Tucker Sales, Inc., 39 Wn.2d 943, 239 P.2d 563 (1952).
95 Buyers who have received part of the goods prior to learning of a subsequent
breach have been held not bound on the entire contract merely because they had ac-
cepted and used the first conforming goods. Stack v. Baird, 171 Wash. 651, 19 P.2d 105
(1933) ; American Nat'l Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 132 Wash. 490, 232
Pac. 295 (1925) ; United Iron Works v. Hosea, 81 Wash. 234, 142 Pac. 673 (1914).
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tion 2-711), he is under a duty after rejection to hold
them with reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a
time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them; but
(c) the buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods
rightfully rejected.
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected
are governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's reme-
dies in general (Section 2-703).
Under the Uniform Sales Act, a distinction is to be drawn between
rejection and rescission, the former being the buyer's remedy if he
acts before he has become the owner, the latter being his remedy
after the property has passed.9" The Code retains the concept of re-
jection, but shuns the concept, or at least the word, "rescission." In
the language of the Code, once the buyer has accepted, his course of
conduct, circumstances permitting, is to "revoke his acceptance."9
Rejection, then, must occur prior to acceptance, or to put the mat-
ter differently, one test of whether or not the buyer has accepted is
whether he has successfully rejected.9" Both under the presently dis-
cussed section of the Code, and under the existing statute,99 rejection,
if effective, must be made within a reasonable time after delivery or
tender, that time being the time within which the buyer may reason-
ably inspect the goods."'
Under the Uniform Sales Act, rejection by the buyer involves no
particular conduct or obligation on his part, and herein the Code
adopts a different point of view. Under the Code, the buyer must no-
tify the seller that he has rejected the goods, and further the buyer
must hold those goods, even though they do not conform to the con-
963 WILLISTON, SALES § 497 (rev. ed. 1948). The specific sections are RCW
63.04.510 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 50] and RCW 63.04.700 [UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69].
See First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Southern Seating & Cabinet Co., 76 Wash. 367,
136 Pac. 127 (1913).
97 Section 2-608.
98 Section 2-606. Under the present statute, too, the buyer's failure to act promptly
in rejecting may amount to an acceptance. Mutual Sales Agency, Inc. v. Hori, 145
Wash. 236, 259 Pac. 712 (1927).9 9 Nielsen v. Woodruff, 133 Wash. 174, 233 Pac. 1 (1925); Carman Dist. Co. v.
Cascade Laundry Co., 111 Wash. 487, 191 Pac. 392 (1920).
100 This time may legitimately be limited by a contractual stipulation. Gruendler
Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co. v. Preston Grain & Milling Co., 124 Wash. 479, 215
Pac. 60 (1923) ; Fred W. Wolf Co. v. Northwestern Dairy Co., 55 Wash. 665, 104 Pac.
1123 (1909). But unreasonable stipulations will not be enforced in accordance with the
literal meaning of the words used. National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-Low Preserving Co.,
170 Wash. 575, 17 P.2d 51 (1932) ; Los Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n v. Pacific Gro-
cery Co., 119 Wash. 293, 205 Pac. 375 (1922); Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, 79
Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381 (1914).
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tract, for the seller's disposition. The next section of the Code im-
poses additional burdens on the buyer.''
Section 2-603. Merchant Buyer's Duties as to Rightfully Re-
jected Goods.
(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3) of
Section 2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of busi-
ness at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a
duty after rejection of goods in his possession or control to fol-
low any reasonable instructions received from the seller with
respect to the goods and in the absence of such instructions to
make reasonable efforts to sell them for the seller's account if
they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily.
Instructions are not reasonable if on demand indemnity for ex-
penses is not forthcoming.
(2) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled
to reimbursement from the seller or out of the proceeds for
reasonable expenses of caring for and selling them, and if the
expenses include no selling commission then to such commis-
sion as is usual in the trade or if there is none to a reasonable
sum not exceeding ten per cent on the gross proceeds.
(3) In complying with this section the buyer is held only to good
faith and good faith conduct hereunder is neither acceptance
nor conversion nor the basis of an action for damages.
So much of this section as imposes a duty on a merchant buyer to
follow the seller's instructions and, in the case of perishables, to re-
sell them, is new. Since the depression, the unenviable position of the
seller of perishables who has shipped them to a distant market has
been aided by a federal statute.' Under certain circumstances, the
buyer of such commodities is positively precluded from rejecting
goods, whether they conform or not.' This is done to prevent the
buyer's taking unfair advantage of the seller's inability to deal with
such goods at a remote place. The same policy underlies the present
section of the Code, in that it requires the buyer to sell perishable
01 Professor Williston regrets this "soft" treatment of contract breaking sellers.
3 WLISTON, SALES § 496 (supp. 1960).
102 Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 46 Stat. 531 (1930), as amended, 7
U.S.C. 499a (1959).
10 3 L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 168 F2d 276, 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 885 (1948).
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commodities rather than to take a hands-off attitude and allow them
to deteriorate, thus increasing the seller's loss.
Under the presently operative statute, a buyer may occasionally
make reasonable disposition of the goods in order to protect the seller
from this loss. This is somewhat dangerous, for it may be construed
as "acceptance" of the goods. Properly understood, of course, it is
not such acceptance of noncomplying merchandise,'"' and reasonable
conduct on the part of the buyer in handling of the goods should be
compensated as part of his damages. Such compensation has been
allowed in Washington,' and is provided for in subsection (2) of
this Code section.
Section 2-604. Buyer's Options as to Salvage of Rightfully
Rejected Goods.
Subject to the provisions of the immediately preceding section on
perishables if the seller gives no instructions within a reason-
able time after notification of rejection the buyer may store the
rejected goods for the seller's account or reship them to him
or resell them for the seller's account with reimbursement as
provided in the preceding section. Such action is not accept-
ance or conversion.
No relevant Washington decision has been found, other than the
decision cited in the discussion of the next preceding section.
Section 2-605. Waiver of Buyer's Objections by Failure to
Particularize.
(1) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a par-
ticular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection
precludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify
rejection or to establish breach
(a) where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably;
or
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection
made a request in writing for a full and final written state-
ment of all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.
(2) Payment against documents made without reservation of rights
precludes recovery of the payment for defects apparent on the
face of the documents.
:104 Subsection (3) so provides.
105 R. P. Arkley Lumber Co. v. Vincent, 121 Wash. 512, 209 Pac. 690 (1922).
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A buyer who, in rejecting goods, fails to mention a defect which he
subsequently seeks to raise runs two risks: (1) His late mention of the
defect suggests that it was not the real reason for his rejection, that
he is grabbing for straws to evade a just obligation for the price, and
thus tends to discredit the validity of his complaint. (2) His failure
to particularize a defect may estop him from later claiming it, where
the seller is prejudiced in some way by the failure.
Subsection (1) (a) of this Code section adopts the second of these
effects of failure to specify defects, by precluding the buyer from using
it where the seller could have corrected the defect had it been timely
raised. This accords with Washington decisions."'8 Subsection (1) (b)
adds to this provision that as between merchants a seller may force
the buyer to list his objections, thus effectually limiting the buyer to,
those objections in any later discussions or suit. Absent this and ab-
sent estoppel, the buyer may raise any objection he has at any time."'7
Though the statute does not cover the matter, there remains the sub-
stantial risk that the trier of fact will disbelieve the buyer's late efforts
to raise objections.0 8
Subsection (2) merely applies the same principle to objections to
documents tendered for payment.
Section 2-606. What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods.
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signi-
fies to the seller that the goods are conforming or that he
will take or retain them in spite of their non-conformity;
or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Sec-
tion 2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until the
buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them;
or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but
if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is an accept-
ance only if ratified by him.
106 Angeles Gravel & Supply Co. v. Clallam County Hosp. Dist., 42 Wn.2d 827,
259 P.2d 366 (1953) ; Armour & Co. v. Jesmer, 76 Wash. 475, 136 Pac. 689 (1913);
Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911).
107 Prescott & Co. v. Powles Co., 113 Wash. 177, 193 Pac. 680 (1920) ; Nelson v.
Imperial Trading Co., 69 Wash. 442, 125 Pac. 777 (1912).
los Wares v. Washington Grocery Co., 136 Wash. 53, 238 Pac. 911 (1925) ; Fink v.
Marr, 81 Wash. 92, 142 Pac. 482 (1914) ; Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385,
113 Pac. 1100 (1911).
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(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of
that entire unit.
This section states concisely the circumstances which have been
sufficient to show the buyer's acceptance under the present Uniform
Sales Act. 9 and by judicial decision."' The rules announced in sub-
section (1) cover the typical fact patterns posing the issue of whether
acceptance has occurred. The section does not purport to settle the
effect of the acceptance, a matter settled elsewhere."' In point of fact,
however, the effect can scarcely be divorced from the fact of accept-
109 RCW 63.04.490 [UNIFoRM SALEs AcT § 48].
110 This note is intended merely to summarize the decisions respecting acts consti-
tuting acceptance. The effect of the acceptance is covered by § 2-607. It must, how-
ever, be observed that a buyer's words or conduct may signify either that he accepts
the goods as fully complying with the contract, or that he accepts them, reserving the
matter of noncompliance to be taken up in a claim for damages for nonconformity. The
mere act of acceptance does not preclude a claim of damage for nonconformity under
§ 2-607.
Statements by the buyer expressing satisfaction of the goods as delivered would
constitute acceptance, but in the litigated cases these statements have rarely been suffi-
cient to prevent the buyer from raising objections to the goods at a later time. See,
e.g., Buob v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 191 Wash. 477, 71 P.2d 559 (1937); 3. I. Case
Threshing Mach. Co. v. Scott, 96 Wash. 566, 165 Pac. 485 (1917).
Payment of the price by the buyer after a substantial time to test the goods consti-
tutes evidence of acceptance which under the Code is not conclusive. Official com-
ment 3. Though there are statements in some Washington decisions suggesting that
payment by the buyer is at least very persuasive evidence of acceptance, most of the
cases are consistent with the rule announced by the Code. Fines v. West Side Imp.
Co., 156 Wash. Dec. 317, 352 P.2d 1018 (1960) ; Frisken v. Art Strand Floor Cover-
ings, Inc., 47 Wn.2d 587, 288 P.2d 1087 (1955) ; Smelt Fishermen's Ass'n v. Soleim,
39 Wn.2d 524, 236 P.2d 1057 (1951) ; Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Case Shingle &
Lumber Co., 152 Wash. 37, 276 Pac. 892 (1929) ; Greenwood v. International Harvester
Co., 122 Wash. 603, 211 Pac. 727 (1922) ; Maltbie v. Gadd, 101 Wash. 483, 172 Pac. 557(1918).
The buyer's entering into some new obligation after he has used the goods is gen-
erally construed as acceptance. Fines v. West Side Imp. Co., supra; Primm v. Wock-
ner, 156 Wash. Dec. 214, 351 P.2d 933 (1960) ; Carr v. Bonthius, 79 Wash. 282, 140
Pac. 339 (1914).
Use of the goods by the buyer produces hard cases and thus tends toward making
bad law. Only such use as may truly be said to be inconsistent with the seller's owner-
ship amounts to an acceptance. Thus, after a seller has installed a furnace in mid-
winter, the buyer's use of it till warm weather hardly leads to the conclusion that he
has accepted the goods and thus cannot "rescind." Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473,
256 P.2d 298 (1953). Coovert v. Ingwersen, 37 Wn.2d 797, 226 P.2d 187 (1951) to the
contrary has been criticized. Note 27 WASH. L. Rav. 165 (1952). Other cases are
merely illustrative of the types of fact patterns where use by the buyer has been held
an acceptance vel non under particular circumstances. Fines v. West Side Imp. Co.,
supra; Frisken v. Art Strand Floor Coverings, Inc., supra; Campbell v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 172 Wash. 428, 20 P.2d 594 (1933) ; Sloane v. State, 161 Wash. 414, 297 Pac. 194
(1931) ; Kahl v. Ablan, 160 Wash. 201, 294 Pac. 1010 (1931) ; Toledo Scale Co. v.
Grusczynksi, 155 Wash. 253, 283 Pac. 1086 (1930); John S. Hudson, Inc. v. Power
Plant Eng'r Co., 154 Wash. 172, 281 Pac. 324 (1929) ; Carstens Packing Co. v. Swift
& Co., 154 Wash. 15, 280 Pac. 351 (1929) ; Creel v. Nettleton, 151 Wash. 440, 276
Pac. 91 (1929) ; Lowenthal Co. v. McCormack Bros. Co., 144 Wash. 229, 257 Pac. 632
(1927) : Los Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n v. Pacific Grocery Co., 119 Wash. 293, 205
Pac. 375 (1922) ; Noel v. Garford Motor Truck Co., 111 Wash. 650, 191 Pac. 828(1920) ; Cuschner v. Pittsburgh-Hickson Co., 91 Wash. 371, 157 Pac. 879 (1916);
Perine Mach. Co. v. Buck, 90 Wash. 344, 156 Pac. 20 (1916).
'll Section 2-607.
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ance, because the buyer's conduct may demonstrate, (a) that he re-
fuses the goods, (b) that he accepts the goods as fully complying with
the contract in every detail, or (c) a somewhat intermediate position
that he is willing to accept the goods, but he does not thereby relin-
quish any right he may have to compensation for defects in the goods
which he will overlook in receiving the goods, but not in discharging
the seller's liability. In substance, this third alternative expresses the
effect of acceptance under the Code.
In some of the leading cases,112 acceptance of the goods has become
interwoven with other questions, such as risk of loss and the passage
of the property interest in the goods. Under the Code, these matters
are separately treated without reference to acceptance.11
Section 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Bur-
den of Establishing Breach After Acceptance; Notice of Claim or
Litigation to Person Answerable Over.
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods ac-
cepted.
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the
goods accepted and if made with knowledge of a non-conform-
ity cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance was
on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would
be seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself impair
any other remedy provided by this Article for non-conformity.
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy; and
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection
(3) of Section 2-312) and the buyer is sued as a result of
such a breach he must so notify the seller within a reason-
able time after he receives notice of the litigation or be
barred from any remedy over for liability established by
the litigation.
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with re-
spect to the goods accepted.
112 Inland Seed Co. v. Washington-Idaho Seed Co., 160 Wash. 244, 294 Pac. 991
(1931), is such a case, and it relies on Henry Glass & Co. v. Misroch, 239 N.Y. 475,
147 N.E. 71 (1925), the main case on the point
llsOffidal comment 2.
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(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of warranty or other obli-
gation for which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If
the notice states that the seller may come in and defend
and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in
any action against him by his buyer by any determination
of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the seller
after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and
defend he is so bound.
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection
(3) of Section 2-312) the original seller may demand in
writing that his buyer turn over to him control of the litiga-
tion including settlement or else be barred from any
remedy over and if he also agrees to bear all expense and
to satisfy any adverse judgment, then unless the buyer
after seasonable receipt of the demand does turn over
control the buyer is so barred.
(6) The provisions of subsections (3), (4) and (5) apply to any
obligation of a buyer to hold the seller harmless against in-
fringement or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2-312).
Subsection (1) restates the principle of the present statute. 1 '
Subsection (2) makes it quite clear that a buyer who has accepted
goods is not in the same care-free position of a buyer who rejects them
on tender. The acceptance precludes rejection and, indeed, is final as
an acceptance, except for specific provisions of the presently discussed
section and Section 2-608, by which an acceptance can be revoked.
The Washington decisions, though couched in different language, have
generally recognized this principle. Retention and use of goods sold
after discovery of defects have often prevented "rescission" by the
buyer."
114 RCW 63.04.420 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 41].
1"5 Wilson v. Pearce, 156 Wash. Dec. 685, 355 P.2d 154 (1960) ; Fines v. West Side
Imp. Co., 156 Wash. Dec. 317, 352 P.2d 1018 (1960) ; Sloane v. State, 161 Wash. 414,
297 Pac. 194 (1931) ; Kahl v. Ablan, 160 Wash. 201, 294 Pac. 1010 (1931) ; John S.
Hudson, Inc. v. Power Plant Eng'r Co., 154 Wash. 172, 281 Pac. 324 (1929) ; Creel
v. Nettleton, 151 Wash. 440, 276 Pac. 91 (1929) ; Noel v. Garford Motor Truck Co.,
111 Wash. 650, 191 Pac. 828 (1920) ; Kleeb v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 27 Wash. 648,
68 Pac. 202 (1902) ; Eldridge v. Young America & Cliff Consol. Mining Co., 27 Wash.
297, 67 Pac. 703 (1902).
The circumstances surrounding the delay must be considered; consequently, a buyer
has been permitted to rescind after considerable delay where he has made his intention
to rescind quite clear. Primm v. Wockner, 156 Wash. Dec. 214, 351 P.2d 933 (1960) ;
Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) ; Bleyhl v. Tea Garden Prods.
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The conduct of the buyer may, of course, demonstrate that the
goods fully comply with the contract, in which case no damage claim
exists against the seller."' The Code makes it clear that the mere
acceptance does not have that effect, for it preserves any remedy other
than rejection. While there are occasional statements in some Wash-
ington decisions that acceptance per se precludes a subsequent damage
action, 17 the proper view is in accord with the Code provision that
such an action can be brought successfully even after acceptance by
the buyer.1
One element of the buyer's conduct is accorded special treatment
both under the Uniform Sales Act" and under the Code,2 0 namely
the buyer's failure to notify the seller within a reasonable time of the
breach. This may be accounted for either on the assumption that the
buyer's failure to give notice of defects is a silent admission that the
goods conform, or on the theory that the failure to notify so prejudices
the seller's ability to defend against a subsequent suit, that the buyer
should be deprived of his cause because of his delay. The provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act and of the Code are categorical on the point.
Though the Washington court has bowed to the rule,' the seller's
attempt to avoid liability by the assertion of the failure to receive
notice of defect is uniformly unsuccessful, either because the facts
show that reasonable notice was given, or because the court adopts
"judge made" exceptions to the rule, namely (1) notice is not required
where the warranty is one of title,.2 or (2) notice is not required where
liability is imposed for breach of warranty absent privity.'2 8 While
Co., 30 Wn.2d 447, 191 P.2d 851 (1948); Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33
P.2d 105 (1934); Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Pacific Tank & Silo Co., 76 Wash. 452,
136 Pac. 691 (1913).
Of particular significance in evaluating the buyer's delay in disavowing acceptance
of the goods is the circumstance that the seller has urged the buyer to retain them
under assurances that they would be made good. Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568,
33 P.2d 105 (1934) ; J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Scott, 96 Wash. 566, 165 Pac.
485 (1917).
116 Freeman v. Stemm Bros. Co., 44 Wn2d 189, 265 P.2d 1055 (1954).
'" Carstens Packing Co. v. Swift & Co., 154 Wash. 15, 280 Pac. 351 (1929) ; White
v. Little Co., 118 Wash. 582, 204 Pac. 186 (1922) (this case requires express qualifica-
tion of the acceptance).
"is Dally v. Isaacson, 40 Wn.2d 574, 245 P.2d 200 (1952) ; Ketchum v. Albertson
Bulb Gardens, 142 Wash. 134. 252 Pac. 523 (1927) ; W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Harris, 48
Wash. 519, 93 Pac. 1080 (1908).
". RCW 63.04.500 fUinoaa SALs AcT § 49].
120 Section 2-607, (3) (a).
121 Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952) ; Bleyhl v.
Tea Garden Prods. Co., 30 Wn.2d 447, 191 P.2d 851 (1948); Baum v. Murray, 23
Wn.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945) ; Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 163 Wash.
164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931).
122 O'Connor v. Teasdale, 34 Wn.2d 259, 209 P.2d 274 (1949). See 35 WAsH. L.
REv. 619, n. 16 (1960).
123 La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wn.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
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one is reluctant to bar the relief of an injured consumer by technical
traps, it is believed that the notice requirement is a fair one, and thus
these exceptions should not be made to the clear wording of the Code.
Subsection (3) (b) is new.
Subsection (4) is a clear-cut allocation of the burden of proof on
the question of damages, but it follows the normal rule that once the
buyer has accepted, his liability for the price is prima facie established
and any claim for damages he makes, either as an offset against the
price or as an independent claim, must amount to an affirmative claim
by him.
Subsection (5), authorizing a buyer who resells to vouch in his
supplier is new. This buyer is protected by the vouching-in process
under some circumstances where he could not use impleader to drag
his supplier into the suit. There is Washington authority in the in-
demnitor-indemitee situation that a notice to the indemnitor of pending
suit against the indemnitee may be sufficient to bind the indemnitor to
factual determinations made in that suit.12 There is also a suggestion
that a notice to the seller in a breach of warranty of title situation
may require the seller to make good losses established in a suit to
sustain that title,"' but though one case has been found where notice
of a pending suit for breach of warranty of quality or description was
involved, nothing seems to have turned on the principle of "vouching
in.""' 6 It is believed, therefore, that subsection (5) will offer new
relief to the "middle man," freeing him of the difficulties incident to
his trying to defend a suit brought by his customer for breach of
warranty of quality, and at the same time trying to preserve his rights
against his supplier in the event his defense is unsuccessful."'
Section 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part.
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial
unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to
him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
124 Nelson v. Sponberg, 51 Wn.2d 371, 318 P.2d 951 (1957).
125 Bevan v. Muir, 53 Wash. 54, 101 Pac. 485 (1909).
126 Ingalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
127 If he sues the supplier before the suit against him is decided, he may be em-
barrassed by having taken inconsistent positions. See Frank R. Jelleff, Inc. v. Braden,
233 F.2d 671 (D. C. Cir. 1956). Yet if he waits for the suit against him to be decided,
the statute of limitations may bar his claim. Cf. Ingalls v. Angell, supra note 126, and
subsequent discussion of UNIFORM CoMMacrAI CODE § 2-725.
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(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance
was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground
for it and before any substantial change in condition of the
goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effec-
tive until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with
regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
By changing the word "rescind," as it appears under the present
Uniform Sales Act, 2' to "revoke his acceptance," the Code brings
about some major changes in the law. Paramount among those changes
is the abolition of any requirement of an election between "rescission"
and a claim for damages. 2 Under the Code, both revocation of his
acceptance and the claim of damages are available to the buyer."'
The Code recognizes that revocation of acceptance is not lightly to
be come by, so it limits its availability to cases where the acceptance
resulting from urgings and assurances by the seller that he would make
the goods comply,13' or to situations where the buyer did not discover
128 RCW 63.04.700 [Unoam SALs AcT § 69].
12 The landmark case in Washington is Houser & Haines Mfg. Co. v. McKay, 53
Wash. 337, 101 Pac. 894 (1909). In that case a buyer of a harvester lost his grain
crop because of defects in the machine. He sought to recover (a) the price he had
paid, and (b) the loss of the crop. The majority opinion required him to elect between
these two. Under the Code, no such election is required, nor should it be. If we are to
assume that rescission contemplates restoration of the status quo, it would seem that
both items are properly allowable to the buyer. The dissenting opinion sums it up
nicely: "If A purchases a horse of B for $300, and under a warranty that the horse is
a safe driving horse, and instead he proves to be vicious and wild and when he is
hitched up, runs away, demolishes A's carriage, which is worth $300, it is evident that
A is injured in the whole transaction $600, $300 for the purchase price of the horse,
which is useless to him, and $300 for the loss of the carriage. And yet this court, in
effect, decides that he must keep the horse, which he cannot use and which is a source
of constant expense to him; in order to recover for damages to his carriage; or, if he
desire to recover the purchase price of the horse, he must lose his claim for damages
to his carriage.....
Though this case has been followed, e.g., Holt Mfg. Co. v. Strachan, 77 Wash. 380,
137 Pac. 1006 (1914) ; Blake-Rutherford Farms Co. v. Holt Mfg. Co., 70 Wash. 192,
126 Pac. 418 (1912) ; the court has often had occasion to refuse to enforce the harsh
election rule. See Letres v. Wash-Co-op Chick Ass'n, 8 Wn.2d 64, Ill P.2d 594
(1941) ; Warren v. W. W. Sheane Auto Co., 118 Wash. 213, 203 Pac. 372 (1922) ;
First Church of Christ Scientist v. Southern Seating & Cabinet Co., 76 Wash. 367,
136 Pac. 127 (1913).
130 Official comment 1. There are some suggestions in early Washington decisions
that a buyer may not rescind for breach of warranty absent fraud. Sevier v. Hopkins,
101 Wash. 404, 172 Pac. 550 (1918) ; Klock v. Newbury, 63 Wash. 153, 114 Pac. 1032
(1911). Clearly, the Code permits him to revoke his acceptance for breach of warranty,
even though no fraud is shown.
131 The Washington decisions accord under the present statute. Lacay Plywood Co.
v. Wienker, 42 Wn.2d 719, 258 P.2d 477 (1953) ; Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473,
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the defects either because of those assurances made by the seller or
because the defects were latent.'32
Further, by subsection (2) the buyer must act reasonably promptly
after he discovers the defect in the goods. This is, of course, a factual
question not dissimilar to the one posed under the present statute
where the buyer seeks to rescind after some delay. 3' In no case will
the buyer be permitted to revoke his acceptance where he cannot
restore to the seller his goods, except where the goods were destroyed
or substantially changed because of their own defects. 4 The Code
does not seem to require that the buyer actually return the goods to
the seller;.. 5 he is obligated only to give notice.'
Section 2-609. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance.
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that
the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not
be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise
256 P.2d 298 (1953) ; Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33 P.2d 105 (1934); Noel
v. Garford Motor Truck Co., 111 Wash. 650, 191 Pac. 828 (1920); United Iron
Works v. Rathskeller Co., 94 Wash. 67, 161 Pac. 1197 (1916) ; Schroeder v. Hotel
Commercial Co., 84 Wash. 685, 147 Pac. 417 (1915); Thompson v. Rhodehamel, 71
Wash. 24, 127 Pac. 572 (1912); Berlin Mach. Works v. Fuller, 59 Wash. 572, 110
Pac. 422 (1910).
182 Accord, Frisken v. Art Strand, Etc., 47 Wn.2d 587, 288 P.2d 1087 (1955);
Cooney v. Mossbach, 128 Wash. 427, 222 Pac. 893 (1924). The last cited case must
involve this principle, though it is somewhat curious in that some months elapsed before
the buyer discovered that he had received a 1917 or 1918 model car instead of the
promised 1919 model.
L83 Wilson v. Pearce, 156 Wash. Dec. 685, 355 P.2d 154 (1960) ; Fines v. West Side
Imp. Co., 156 Wash. Dec. 317, 352 P.2d 1018 (1960) ; Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d
513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) ; Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772
(1953) ; Brown v. Vantuyl, 40 Wn2d 364, 242 P.2d 1021 (1952) ; Coover v. Ingwerson,
37 Wn.2d 797, 226 P.2d 187 (1951), criticized in 27 WASH. L. REv. 165 (1952) ; W. W.
Sheane Auto Co. v. Williams, 143 Wash. 352, 255 Pac. 147 (1927); Singmaster v.
Hall, 98 Wash. 134, 167 Pac. 136 (1917); Sowles v. Fleetwood, 97 Wash. 166, 165
Pac. 1056 (1917) ; Peterson v. Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co., 89 Wash. 141, 154 Pac.
123 (1916) ; Hison v. Hughes, 72 Wash. 362, 130 Pac. 478 (1913) ; Aurora Land Co.
v. Keevan, 67 Wash. 305, 121 Pac. 469 (1912) ; Noble v. Olympia Brewing Co., 64
Wash. 461, 117 Pac. 241 (1911) ; Dickinson Fire & Pressed Brick Co. v. Crowe & Co.,
63 Wash. 550, 115 Pac. 1087 (1911).
134Accord, American Exch. Bank v. Smith, 173 Wash. 441, 23 P.2d 414 (1933);
Noel v. Garford Motor Truck Co., 111 Wash. 650, 191 Pac. 828 (1920) ; Pierce County
Auto Co. v. Menard, 92 Wash. 149, 158 Pac. 729 (1916) ; Burnley v. Shinn, 80 Wash.
240, 141 Pac. 326 (1914) ; Konnerup v. Allen, 56 Wash. 292, 105 Pac. 639 (1909).
Worthless goods need not be returned, of course. Official comment 6; Pierce County
Auto Co. v. Menard, supra.
If the seller can protect against the change in the goods, it would seem that he
cannot block revocation of acceptance for such changes therein. Kracke v. Cohen, 121
Wash. 253, 208 Pac. 1100 (1922). This is probably the proper explanation of Payne v.
Lindsey Co., 71 Wash. 293, 128 Pac. 678 (1912), though the broad statement of the
rule therein that the buyer is precluded from rescission only where harm to the goods
was his fault seems inaccurate.
135 Loveland v. Jenkins-Boys Co., 49 Wash. 369, 95 Pac. 490 (1908), is in accord.
136 For a review of the cases under the present statute, see Holland Furnace Co. v.
Korth, 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953).
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with respect to the performance of either party the other may
in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and
until he receives such assurance may if commercially reason-
able suspend any performance for which he has not already
received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for in-
security and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be
determined according to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not
prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate as-
surance of future performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within
a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of
due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of
the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.
Except for certain particular provisions setting forth the privileges
of a seller on insolvency of the buyer, 8' nothing in the present statute
specifically covers the point here stated. Basically involved, however,
is the concept of prospective failure of consideration.'88 When it ap-
pears to a party to a sales transaction that his chances of obtaining
the promised counter-performance are impaired, he may suspend per-
formance. Under a leading Washington decision, this right is recog-
nized, but seems to be limited to circumstances which-clearly threaten
a material failure to perform the contract.'8 9 Under the Code, the
excuse is not limited to such circumstances, for the facts creating a
reasonable belief that performance will not be forthcoming need not
relate directly to performance of that contract at all.
Faced with reasonable grounds for doubt about the continued ability
of the other contracting party to perform, the seller or buyer may
demand adequate assurance of due performance. This is new, and
the controlling principles are outlined in the official comments which
are of much value.
Finally, a failure to provide such assurance as is reasonably called
for is equal to a breach of contract by anticipation or repudiation
under subsection (4). This, too, is new, and completes the arsenal
137RCW 63.04.540 [UNIroRM SALES AcT § 53]; RCW 63.04.550 [UNIFORM SALES
AcT § 54]; RCW 63.04.560 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 55]; RCW 63.04.640(2) [UNI-
FORM SALES AcT § 63 (2)].138 See Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsH. L. R1v. 467, 474
(1959)-
189 Jacks v. Blazer, 39 Wn.2d 277, 235 P.2d 187 (1951).
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provided either party to the sale transaction to protect himself when
his expectancies under the contract are endangered. This effort to
protect reasonable expectancies reflects once more the adoption by the
Code writers of the concepts prevalent among business men rather
than the technical, limited precepts of the present statute.
Section 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a per-
formance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair
the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by
the repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section
2-711), even though he has notified the repudiating party
that he would await the latter's performance and has urged
retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's
right to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding
breach or to salvage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
The preceding section of the Code suggests fact patterns in which
one party may be excused from further performance of his obligations.
The presently discussed section states another such circumstance, the
repudiation of the contract by either party. Upon such repudiation,
both under the Code and by judicial decision, the innocent (non-
repudiating) party may take one of two courses of action:
First, he may suspend performance, on the theory that the repudia-
tion excuses his further carrying out the contract.14
Second, he may institute any appropriate remedy for breach,1 ' even
though he may have urged the repudiator to perform the contract. 12
The normal appropriate remedy will be an action for damages. It is
doubtful whether the seller who, after repudiation by the buyer, fails
to tender the contracted-for goods can recover the purchase price,'4'
140 Walker v. Herke, 20 Wn.2d 239, 147 P.2d 255 (1944); Kilgas v. Mother's
Grandma Cookie Co., 156 Wash. 8, 285 Pac. 1118 (1930) ; Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellens-
burg Milling Co., 116 Wash. 266, 199 Pac. 238 (1921) ; Citizens Bank v. Willing, 109
Wash. 464, 186 Pac. 1072 (1920) ; Curtis v. Parks, 57 Wash. 223, 106 Pac. 740 (1910).
141 Walker v. Herke, supra note 140; Cron & Dehn Inc. v. Chedan Packing Co., 158
Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930).
142 Phoenix Packing Co. v. Humphrey-Ball Co., 58 Wash. 396, 108 Pac. 952 (1910),
has some inconsistent sounding language to the contrary on this point.
143 Paulsen v. Gilmore, 160 Wash. 232, 295 Pac. 135 (1931).
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for obviously he can recover that price only if he is in a position to
hold goods for the buyer.' "4
The damages recoverable have traditionally been measured not as
of the time of the breach, but as of the time of the performance set in
the contract. 45 On this point, however, the Code adopts a different
rule, at least where it is the seller who repudiates. This rule, to be
discussed later, sets the measure of damages for the seller's repudia-
tion as of the time "when the buyer learned of the breach.'.. This is
consistent with the view that the buyer is normally entitled to Cccover))
upon breach by the seller 47 This theory has been recognized in
Washington in a case dealing with a futures contract for apples, where
the measure of damages was not the difference between contract and
market price on the date of delivery, but was the value of a futures
contract for such goods as of the day of the breach.""
Section 2-611. Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation.
(1) Until the repudiating party's next performance is due he can
retract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party has since the
repudiation cancelled or materially changed his position or
otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation final.
(2) Retraction may be by any method which clearly indicates to
the aggrieved party that the repudiating party intends to per-
form, but must include any assurance justifiably demanded
under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-609).
(3) Retraction reinstates the repudiating party's rights under the
contract with due excuse and allowance to the aggrieved party
for any delay occasioned by the repudiation.
Though there is no statutory authority for the rule of this Code
section, the Washington court has adopted this approach4 9 following
traditional common law rules. 50
Section 2-612. "Installment Contract"; Breach.
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes
the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted,
144 See § 2-709 (3), and official comment 7 thereto.
1453 WILLISToN, SALEs § 587 (rev. ed. 1948).
146 Section 2-713.
147 Section 2-712.
148 Cron & Dehn Inc. v. Chelan Packing Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930).
'49 Walker v. Herke, 20 Wn.2d 239, 147 P.2d 255 (1944).
'.50 REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 319 (1932).
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even though the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a
separate contract" or its equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming
if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that
installment and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a
defect in the required documents; but if the non-conformity
does not fall within subsection (3) and the seller gives adequate
assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or
more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole
contract there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party
reinstates the contract if he accepts a non-conforming install-
ment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he
brings an action with respect only to past installments or de-
mands performance as to future installments.
In discussing section 2-307, the point was made that where lot de-
liveries were contemplated, the buyer must specifically spell out an
agreement to pay on conclusion of all deliveries, else he will be re-
quired to pay for each installment as delivered.'51 The presently dis-
cussed section implements this by spelling out that an installment
contract may be found to exist whether or not installment payments
are specifically called for by the contract, and whether or not the con-
tract is divisible in the technical sense of the word. In short, install-
ment performance by the seller is justified whenever all the circum-
stances "tacitly authorize" it.'52 This does not constitute a departure
from current law, 5' which also permits an agreement for installment
performance to be implied from the circumstances.
In the installment contract transaction, the buyer is warranted in
rejecting an installment only when nonconformance substantially im-
pairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured. This differs
from the approach taken in non-installment contracts wherein the
buyer may reject "for any reason.... The apparent reason for the
divergent treatment is a recognition that a contractual arrangement
looking forward to an extended series of performances ought not be
15135 WAsHi. L. REv. 432 (1960).
152 Official comment 2.
153 Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc. v. Independent Bakery, Inc., 165 Wash. 360, 5 P.2d
517 (1931), af'd, 8 P.2d 430, af'd, 10 P.2d 975 (1932) ; Kalispell Flour Mill Co. v.
Marshall, 125 Wash. 80, 215 Pac. 70 (1923).
154 Section 2-601.
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thwarted in mid-stream by anything less than a material breach which
cannot be corrected 55
While the buyer is entitled to be compensated for any defect in an
installment, he is justified in treating the whole contract as breached
(and thus refuse further installments) only where the breach sub-
stantially impairs the value of the whole contract. This, too, is aimed
at effectively keeping alive contractual arrangements until there has
been a repudiation or a material breach of the entire contract. This
accords with Washington decisions," 6 though it spells out with greater
clarity the standard by which a breach will be a breach of the whole
contract, and not of an installment only. It further clarifies the point
that the test used is not whether the breach is equal to a repudiation,
but merely whether there has been a substantial impairment of the
buyer's expectancy.
Finally, even though a breach has occurred which constitutes a
substantial impairment of the entire contract, the buyer may not use
it as a breach of the entire contract if the buyer fails to notify the
seller of his desire to cancel, or if the buyer sues for damages only as
to past installments, or if he demands future performance. These
enumerated acts constitute, in the language of the decisions, a mani-
festation of the buyer's election to keep the contract in existence, thus
binding himself to accept further complying performance." It would
seem that such conduct on the part of the buyer does not constitute a
waiver of his claim for damages suffered as the result of the breach;"8
it merely precludes his treating the entire contract as breached. The
damages thus recoverable will be based as of the time the buyer learns
of the breach under the Code,.55 and not as of the date of the breach
as under present law.0
To be remembered is that this section is one part of a sequence, and
that in one section of that sequence, section 2-609, either party is given
the right to demand assurance of due performance on the appearance
of reasonable grounds for insecurity. An insignificant breach of an
155 Comment, Article 2-Sales-Performance, Breach and Remedies, 53 Nw. U.L. REv.
332, 340 (1958).
156 Jacks v. Blazer, 39 Wn.2d 277, 235 P.2d 187 (1951) ; Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertner,
34 Wn.2d 268, 208 P.2d 906 (1949) ; Nott-Atwater Co. v. Berry, 145 Wash. 640, 261
Pac. 390 (1927).
'57 Fry v. Grangers Warehouse Co., 131 Wash. 497, 230 Pac. 423 (1924). Cf. Bal-
corn v. Kohno, 124 Wash. 628, 215 Pac. 17 (1923), aff', 127 Wash. 697, 221 Pac. 340
(1923), where essentially the same approach is taken, but the court also finds no breach
of the contract.
358 American Fuel Co. v. Interstate Fuel Agency, 261 Fed. 120 (9th Cir. 1919).
'M5 Section 2-713.160 Clements v. Cook, 112 Wash. 217, 191 Pac. 874 (1920).
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installment could justify, under appropriate circumstances, a demand
for such assurance under that section." 1
Section 2-613. Casualty to Identified Goods.
Where the contract requires for its performance goods identified
when the contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty with-
out fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the
buyer, or in a proper case under a "no arrival, no sale" term
(Section 2-324) then
(a) ff the loss is total the contract is avoided; and
(b) ff the loss is partial or the goods have so deteriorated as
no longer to conform to the contract the buyer may never-
theless demand inspection and at his option either treat
the contract as avoided or accept the goods with due allow-
ance from the contract price for the deterioration or the
deficiency in quantity but without further right against
the seller.
Though the cases prior to the adoption in Washington of the Uni-
form Sales Act are not consistent," 2 the Uniform Sales Act's provi-
sions... are basically in accord with the Code. The principal difference
concerns the treatment of partial deterioration and partial destruction
of goods. Under the Uniform Sales Act, acceptance by the buyer of
part of the goods after destruction of the balance made him liable for
the full contract price if the contract was not divisible. This is not
true under the Code, by which the buyer's liability is limited to a
portion of the price."'
Section 2-614. Substituted Performance.
(1) Where without fault of either party the agreed berthing, load-
ing or unloading facilities fail or an agreed type of carrier
becomes unavailable or the agreed manner of delivery other-
wise becomes commercially impracticable but a commercially
reasonable substitute is available, such substitute performance
must be tendered and accepted.
161 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)
118 (1958).
162 W. W. Robinson Co. v. McClaine, 98 Wash. 322, 167 Pac. 912 (1917), excuses
the parties after destruction of the subject matter of the sale without fault of either
party; however, MacLeod v. Aberdeen Brewing Co., 82 Wash. 74, 143 Pac. 440 (1914),
seems to place responsibility on the seller in such circumstances, until "title" passes to
the buyer.
163 RCW 63.04.080 and 63.94.090 [UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 7 and 8].
164 Official comment 1.
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(2) If the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of
domestic or foreign governmental regulation, the seller may
withhold or stop delivery unless the buyer provides a means or
manner of payment which is commercially a substantial equiva-
lent. If delivery has already been taken, payment by the means
or in the manner provided by the regulation discharges the
buyer's obligation unless the regulation is discriminatory,
oppressive or predatory.
Sections 2-613 through 2-615 of the Code are all directed toward
the same basic problem: frustration of the contract by change of
circumstances. The most absolute change of circumstance is the
physical destruction of the goods, covered in the preceding section.
Destruction or impairment of other things contemplated in the per-
formance of the contract may tend toward such frustration, depending
upon how fundamental they are to the performance of the contract.
The present section of the Code deals with two matters not directly
related to the quantity or quality of the goods, or to their existence, or
to their means of production. This section relates only to contemplated
means of delivery and payment. The effect of the section is to prevent
frustration of commercial contracts because of inability to provide the
specifically contracted for means. In the case of delivery, if the con-
templated means becomes unavailable, a reasonably satisfactory sub-
stitute may be provided.
Somewhat the same approach has been taken in Washington deci-
sions from an early date. In Hatch v. Hall,"8 5 a seller had agreed that
the buyer might pay a portion of the purchase price of a threshing
machine by threshing the seller's wheat. In fact, however, after making
the agreement, the seller threshed some 15,000 bushels of wheat him-
slf, and when the buyer objected that this was a breach of the contract,
the seller made an arrangement with a neighbor by which the buyer
could thresh 15,000 bushels of the neighbor's wheat in substitution for
his own. It was held that thereby the seller had substantially per-
formed, and this seems proper in view of the fact that the particular
point involved was largely collateral to the deal between the parties.
In Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Lemley,'66 a more direct analogy
to the present section was presented, for there the seller had agreed to
deliver wheat at a particular warehouse which, on the date of delivery,
was full and thus unable to take delivery. The buyer offered to provide
.65 48 Wash. 109, 92 Pac. 936 (1907).
1a 105 Wash. 508, 178 Pac. 640, aff'd, 181 Pac. 858 (1919).
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sacks, but in the opinion of the court, this would have involved addi-
tional expense to the seller, so the tendered substitute was not one
which the seller was bound to accept, and he could thus rely on the
defense of impossibility. This, it seems, would be the result under the
Code, for clearly the unavailability of the proposed means of delivery
will not shift the burden of providing those means, or a reasonable
substitute." 7 The defense of impossibility of performance will not be
available, of course, where a means of delivery becomes unavailable,
unless that means was agreed to and recognized as fundamental to the
contract. For example, a seller who agrees to deliver wheat, intending
to ship it from a foreign port, is not excused from delivering wheat
when transportation from that port becomes unavailable, unless the
assumption of both contracting parties that this port was the necessary
source of the wheat.
6 8
No Washington decisions have been found respecting the medium
of payment, covered in subsection (2).
Section 2-615. Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions.
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and
subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a
seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made or by compli-
ance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic
governmental regulation or order whether or not it later
proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only
a part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate
production and deliveries among his customers but may at
his option include regular customers not then under con-
tract as well as his own requirements for further manufac-
ture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and
reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will
be delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required
167 Sussman v. Gustav, 109 Wash. 459, 186 Pac. 882 (1920).
168 Thompson & Stacy Co. v. Evans, Coleman & Evans, 100 Wash. 277, 170 Pac. 578
(1918).
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under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made
available for the buyer.
At the outset, it seems evident that any attempt to correlate Wash-
ington law under present statutes with the broad sweep of the Code
will miss the true significance of this section of the Code. The reason
is that to talk in conventional terms of "impossibility," "frustration
of purpose," and the like is not consonant with the essence of this
section, that commercial impracticality will constitute an excuse.
Clearly illustrative cases under present law, suggesting the type of
thing which will excuse, are those dealing with the destruction of an
agreed source of goods, an excuse under present law and, of course,
under the Code,169 so long as the seller has exercised due care to assure
that the source will not fail.170 Some of the older decisions, such as
Isaacson v. Starret,"7I in which a seller was held liable for damages
for failure to deliver in spite of the fact that the supplier's plant was
destroyed in the San Francisco earthquake and also struck by its em-
ployees, will no longer be accepted statements of the law.
The important point is, though, that the broad concept of impracti-
cality as an excuse staggers the imagination of anyone accustomed to
the limited excuses now recognized. A disservice to the Code results
from seeking an equivalence to things past. It will remain for the
courts to give specificity to this word, but they must strive not to be
limited by the older decisions. Full recognition of the full implications
of the Code ought not be prevented by the influence of past decisions.172
Subsection (c) imposes a duty upon the seller to notify where full
performance is not to be forthcoming, a circumstance which sets the
basis for the next following section.
Section 2-616. Procedure on Notice Claiming Excuse.
(1)Where the buyer receives notification of a material or indefinite
delay or an allocation justified under the preceding section he
may by written notification to the seller as to any delivery con-
100 Reinemann v. Anderson, 34 Wn2d 809, 210 P2d 394 (1949) (small crop);
Snipes Mountain Co. v. Benz Bros. & Co., 162 Wash. 334, 298 Pac. 714 (1931);
Leavenworth State Bank v. Cashmere Apple Co., 118 Wash. 356, 204 Pac. 5 (1922)
(destruction of mill) ; Pearce v. Puyallup & Sumner Fruit Growers' Canning Co., 117
Wash. 612, 201 Pac. 905, 208 Pac. 1117 (1921); Patrick v. Watson, 55 Wash. 76, 104
Pac. 144 (1909) (sale of all horses on the land) ; West Coast Shingle Co. v. Markham
Shingle Co., 50 Wash. 681, 97 Pac. 801 (1908).
170 Washington Mfg. Co. v. Midland Lumber Co., 113 Wash. 593, 194 Pac. 777(1921). This case is cited in official comment 5.
17156 Wash. 18, 104 Pac. 1115 (1909).172 The official comments provide the only authoritative interpretation of the rule
until such time as court decisions have given it additional content.
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cerned, and where the prospective deficiency substantially im-
pairs the value of the whole contract under the provisions of
this Article relating to breach of installment contracts (Section
2-612), then also as to the whole,
(a) terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted portion
of the contract; or
(b) modify the contract by agreeing to take his available quota
in substitution.
(2) If after receipt of such notification from the seller the buyer
fails so to modify the contract within a reasonable time not
exceeding thirty days the contract lapses with respect to any
deliveries affected.
(3) The provisions of this section may not be negated by agreement
except in so far as the seller has assumed a greater obligation
under the preceding section.
The preceding section provides an excuse for the seller's non-per-
formance in case of impracticality. The present section demonstrates
that the risk of such nonperformance is not shifted over to the buyer,
for he is not obligated to accept partial performance where the per-
formance is partially impractical. Similarly, he is not obligated to
accept late performance. If he wishes, he may accept the proffered
substitute performance by modifying the contract. If he does not
affirmatively elect this course of conduct, the contract is terminated.
While the mechanics established by this section are new, the principle
behind the section is old. For example, in Prescott & Co. v. Powles &
Co.' the seller of 300 crates of onions was able to ship only 240 crates
because of a governmental preemption of shipping space. By way of
dictum, the court suggests that the seller would in these circumstances
be excused from full performance. By way of holding, the conclusion
is that the seller, not having fully performed, cannot recover damages
for the buyer's refusal to accept the insufficient tender. Such a decision
is entirely consistent with Uniform Commercial Code sections 2-615
and 2-616, for though the seller may have a defense of impracticality
or impossibility, the buyer is not obligated to accept anything less than
full performance, unless he agrees to do so, except in the case of in-
stallment contracts. In contracts of that type, materiality of the
deviation from full compliance is the determining factor.
[This discussion will be concluded in a subsequent issue.]
178 113 Wash. 177, 193 Pac. 680 (1920).
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